In a broad-based study of experiences in psychological research, 65 undergraduates participating in a wide range of psychological experiments were interviewed in depth. Overall findings demonstrated that participants hold varying views, with only 32% of participants characterizing their experiences as completely positive. Participants' descriptions of their debriefing experiences suggest substantial variability in the content, format, and general quality of debriefing practices. Just over 40% of the debriefing experiences were viewed favorably. Positive debriefing experiences were described as including a thorough explanation (...) of the study and detailed information concerning the broader relevance of the experiment to the field of psychology. The most common complaint, characterizing 28.8% of the responses, was that the debriefing was unclear and that insufficient information was provided. Participants' views of psychological research and the discipline of psychology were also elicited. Results are discussed in terms of ethical and methodological implications. (shrink)

Sixty-five undergraduates participating in a wide range of psychological research experiments were interviewed in depth about their research experiences and their views on the process of informed consent. Overall, 32% of research experiences were characterized positively and 41 % were characterized negatively. One major theme of the negative experiences was that experiments were perceived as too invasive, suggesting incomplete explication of negative aspects of research during the informed consent process. Informed consent experiences were viewed positively 80% of the time. However, (...) most of the participants had a limited view of the purpose of informed consent: Less than 20% viewed the process as a decision point. Results suggest a number of common pitfalls to standard informed consent practices that have not generally been recognized. Results are discussed in terms of both ethical and methodological implications. Suggestions for improving the informed consent process are also provided. (shrink)

This article intends to show that the defense of “understanding” as one of the major goals of science education can be grounded on an anti-reductionist perspective on testimony as a source of knowledge. To do so, we critically revisit the discussion between Harvey Siegel and Alvin Goldman about the goals of science education, especially where it involves arguments based on the epistemology of testimony. Subsequently, we come back to a discussion between Charbel N. El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer, on the one (...) hand, and Michael Hoffmann, on the other, striving to strengthen the claim that rather than students’ belief change, understanding should have epistemic priority as a goal of science education. Based on these two lines of discussion, we conclude that the reliance on testimony as a source of knowledge is necessary to the development of a more large and comprehensive scientific understanding by science students. (shrink)

ABSTRACTClose relationship partners often respond to happiness expressed through smiles with capitalization, i.e. they join in attempting to up-regulate and prolong the individual’s positive emotion, and they often respond to crying with interpersonal down-regulation of negative emotions, attempting to dampen the negative emotions. We investigated how people responded when happiness was expressed through tears, an expression termed dimorphous. We hypothesised that the physical expression of crying would prompt interpersonal down-regulation of emotion when the onlooker perceived that the expresser was experiencing (...) negative or positive emotions. When participants were asked how they would behave when faced with smiles of joy, we expected capitalization responses, and when faced with tears of joy, we expected down-regulation responses. In six experimental studies using video and photographic stimuli, we found support for our hypotheses. Throughout our investigations we test and discuss boundaries of and poss... (shrink)

I. Pragmatismus und Neukantianismus Marc Rölli: Die Durchquerung des Absoluten. Zur Hegel-Rezeption John Deweys Wolfgang Bonsiepen: Hegel und der Neukantianismus Matthias Wunsch: Phänomenologie des Symbolischen? Die Hegelrezeption Ernst Cassirers II. Phänomenologie - Ontologie - Lebensphilosophie Annette Sell: Das Geheimnis des Anfangs. Die Aufnahme des Hegelschen Anfangsbegriffs in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers Hans-Ulrich Lessing: Hegel und Helmuth Plessner: Die verpaßte Rezeption Walter Jaeschke: Der Geist und sein Sein. Nicolai Hartmann auf Hegelschen Wegen Holger Glinka: Aus Phänomenologie mach Dialektik. Jean-Paul Sartres Anverwandlung (...) Hegels III. Marxistische Tradition und kritische Theorie Andreas Arndt: Lenin liest Hegel Daniel Althof: Das "Geklapper der Triplizität" - Adornos Hegelrezeption Christoph J. Bauer: Mit Hegel gegen den 'Positivismus' - mit Hegel zum 'Wesen des Menschen'. Herbert Marcuses Interpretation der Hegelschen Urteilslehre IV. Postmoderne und Gegenwart Karin de Boer: Differenz: zwischen Hegel und Derrida Robert B. Pippin: Brandoms Hegel. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is increasing need for peer reviewers as the scientific literature grows. Formal education in biostatistics and research methodology during residency training is lacking. In this pilot study, we addressed these issues by evaluating a novel method of teaching residents about biostatistics and research methodology using peer review of standardized manuscripts. We hypothesized that mentored peer review would improve resident knowledge and perception of these concepts more than non-mentored peer review, while improving review quality.MethodsA partially blinded, randomized, controlled multi-center study (...) was performed. Seventy-eight neurology residents from nine US neurology programs were randomized to receive mentoring from a local faculty member or not. Within a year, residents reviewed a baseline manuscript and four subsequent manuscripts, all with introduced errors designed to teach fundamental review concepts. In the mentored group, mentors discussed completed reviews with residents. Primary outcome measure was change in knowledge score between pre- and post-tests, measuring epidemiology and biostatistics knowledge. Secondary outcome measures included level of confidence in the use and interpretation of statistical concepts before and after intervention, and RQI score for baseline and final manuscripts.ResultsSixty-four residents (82%) completed initial review with gradual decline in completion on subsequent reviews. Change in primary outcome, the difference between pre- and post-test knowledge scores, did not differ between mentored (−8.5%) and non-mentored (−13.9%) residents (p = 0.48). Significant differences in secondary outcomes (using 5-point Likert scale, 5 = strongly agree) included mentored residents reporting enhanced understanding of research methodology (3.69 vs 2.61; p = 0.001), understanding of manuscripts (3.73 vs 2.87; p = 0.006), and application of study results to clinical practice (3.65 vs 2.78; p = 0.005) compared to non-mentored residents. There was no difference between groups in level of interest in peer review (3.00 vs 3.09; p = 0.72) or the quality of manuscript review assessed by the Review Quality Instrument (RQI) (3.25 vs 3.06; p = 0.50).ConclusionsWe used mentored peer review of standardized manuscripts to teach biostatistics and research methodology and introduce the peer review process to residents. Though knowledge level did not change, mentored residents had enhanced perception in their abilities to understand research methodology and manuscripts and apply study results to clinical practice. (shrink)

This text is an interview given by Prof. Dr. Alfredo Pereira Jr. to Leonardo Ferreira Almada, on the occasion of the call for publication of interviews with different Brazilian philosophers. In response to the goal of the Trans/Form/Ação journal call, we sought to carry out an interview in which a PhD professor with an established career presents some elements of his personal and academic stories, as well as clarifies important points of his research, some of his theses and vision (...) of the world based on questions asked by another professor, a historical research partner, and in-depth knowledge of the interviewee’s career. (shrink)

After briefly presenting the approaches to price theory developed in American colonial scholasticism by Tomás de Mercado, Bartolomé de Albornoz and Juan de Matienzo, we intend to demonstrate the preponderant role played by Aristotle and the peculiar reception given to him by these authors in their respective works.

The Critique of Pure Reason—Kant’s First Critique—is one of the most studied texts in intellectual history, but as Alfredo Ferrarin points out in this radically original book, most of that study has focused only on very select parts. Likewise, Kant’s oeuvre as a whole has been compartmentalized, the three Critiques held in rigid isolation from one another. Working against the standard reading of Kant that such compartmentalization has produced, The Powers of Pure Reason explores forgotten parts of the First (...) Critique in order to find an exciting, new, and ultimately central set of concerns by which to read all of Kant’s works. Ferrarin blows the dust off of two egregiously overlooked sections of the First Critique—the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method. There he discovers what he argues is the Critique’s greatest achievement: a conception of the unity of reason and an exploration of the powers it has to reach beyond itself and legislate over the world. With this in mind, Ferrarin dismantles the common vision of Kant as a philosopher writing separately on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics and natural teleology, showing that the three Critiques are united by this underlying theme: the autonomy and teleology of reason, its power and ends. The result is a refreshing new view of Kant, and of reason itself. (shrink)

The Hooks et al. review of microbiota-gut-brain literature provides a constructive criticism of the general approaches encompassing MGB research. This commentary extends their review by: highlighting capabilities of advanced systems-biology “-omics” techniques for microbiome research and recommending that combining these high-resolution techniques with intervention-based experimental design may be the path forward for future MGB research.

My aim in this article is to understand the role of imagination and practical judgment in Kant's moral philosophy. After a comparison of Kant with Rousseau, I explore Kant's moral philosophy itself — unlike Hannah Arendt, who finds in the enlarged mentality of the third Critique the ground for the activity of imagination in a shared world. Instead, I place the concept of moral legislation in its background, the reflection on particulars relevant to deliberation, and discuss the mutual relation of (...) reflection and determination. Not only reflection and determination work together; imagination and judgment imply one another essentially, as interpretation of what is relevant, and as a principle of orientation in the choice of the maxim against the backdrop of a uniform and ordered world. The concepts of analogy and symbolic exhibition turn out to be crucial for how reason represents to itself the reality of ideas in the world. (shrink)

“Iatrophilosophy” is defined as the translational discipline between medicine and philosophy that has a double objective, theoretical and practical. It is presented a model of practical iatrophilosophy applied to chronic pain associated with depression and stress—depresalgia—, that expands Phenomenologic, Hermeneutic, Dynamic Psychotherapy (PHD) to the general medical field. It starts from the general model of the medical triad - disease, illness, and sickness- and, in the horizon of Ortega's anthropology, five nuclear metaphors are proposed: greed of the body, anguish of (...) circumstance, personal tear, personal knots, and personal expropriation. These are related to the neurobiological mechanisms of central sensitization, allostasis, and alteration of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. A personal recovery process based on therapeutic concord is proposed. The analysis of chronic pain and other complex health problems can benefit from philosophical methodologies such as clinical hermeneutics. (shrink)

The notion of productive imagination is not only of crucial importance for Kant’s idea of pure reason, and for the unity of our theoretical experience, it is also stunningly seminal for post-Kantian philosophy: think, for instance, of Fichte, Schelling, the German Romantics, and of Hegel’s Glauben und Wissen. For the historian of philosophy, in particular, it is a very intriguing notion. Yet, however fundamental the notion of productive imagination is, it is not easy to determine its precise role in the (...) Critique of Pure Reason; the question of its historical genealogy is even more obscure. (shrink)

Critiques of Western feminists’ attempts to extend claims about gender injustice to the global context highlighted a dilemma facing Western feminists, what I call the global gender justice dilemma. In response to this dilemma, Alison M. Jaggar argues that Western feminists should turn our attention away from trying to resolve it and, instead, toward examination of our own complicity in the processes that produce injustice. I suggest that this kind of approach is helpful in responding to an additional dilemma that (...) confronts the Western feminist, namely the epistemic dilemma. Western feminists can speak for women of the global South and run the risk of distorting those women’s experience and further silencing their voices, or we can refuse to speak and abdicate our responsibilities to address injustice. I argue that we should address this dilemma not by trying to resolve it but by examining our role in the reproduction of epistemically unjust practices. To explain this response, I offer a preliminary account of epistemic injustice as epistemic oppression. I conclude by claiming that our own epistemic complicity in epistemically oppressive social practices is a weighty reason for us to work to transform those practices. (shrink)

Hegel is, arguably, the most difficult of all philosophers. To find a way into his thought interpreters have usually approached him as though he were developing Kantian and Fichtean themes. This book demonstrates in a systematic way that it makes much more sense to view Hegel's idealism in relation to the metaphysical and epistemological tradition stemming from Aristotle. The book offers an account of Hegel's idealism in light of his interpretation, discussion, assimilation and critique of Aristotle's philosophy. There are explorations (...) of Hegelian and Aristotelian views of system and history; being, metaphysics, logic, and truth; nature and subjectivity; spirit, knowledge, and self-knowledge; ethics and politics. No serious student of Hegel can afford to ignore this major interpretation. It will also be of interest in such fields as political science and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Jewish law has a history stretching from the early period to the modern State of Israel, encompassing the Talmud, Geonic and later codifications, the Spanish Golden Age, medieval and modern responsa, the Holocaust and modern reforms. Fifteen distinct periods are separately studied in this volume, each one by a leading specialist, and the emphasis throughout is on the development of the institutions and sources of the law.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction A “Retrieval” of Aristotle? Who Is Hegel's Aristotle? Is Hegel's Aristotle Compatible with His Idea of a History of Philosophy? The Limits of Aristotle According to Hegel The Limits of Hegel's Aristotle.

We consider the theory Thprin of Boolean algebras with a principal ideal, the theory Thmax of Boolean algebras with a maximal ideal, the theory Thac of atomic Boolean algebras with an ideal where the supremum of the ideal exists, and the theory Thsa of atomless Boolean algebras with an ideal where the supremum of the ideal exists. First, we find elementary invariants for Thprin and Thsa. If T is a theory in a first order language and α is a linear (...) order with least element, then we let Sentalg be the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra with respect to T, and we let intalg be the interval algebra of α. Using rank diagrams, we show that Sentalg ⋍ intalg, Sentalg ⋍ intalg ⋍ Sentalg, and Sentalg ⋍ intalg. For Thmax and Thac we use Ershov's elementary invariants of these theories. We also show that the algebra of formulas of the theory Tx of Boolean algebras with finitely many ideals is atomic. (shrink)

L'analyste des discours qui surgissent au sein de conflits sociaux, de controverses, de débats publics, a souvent le sentiment qu'il n'observe pas des 'camps' correspondant à des groupes d'individus, mais des agencements qui doivent être considérés indépendamment des intentions, des stratégies ou des opinions de ceux qui y sont impliqués. Pour décrire les processus dans lesquels se constituent ces configurations conflictuelles, on fait alors appel à des combinaisons conceptuelles plus ou moins heureuses. À partir de l'hypothèse selon laquelle les conflits (...) sociaux évoluent par le renforcement/affaiblissement de la disponibilité de types d'actions, ce livre se propose de construire une théorie sémantique qui permette d'éclairer les mécanismes à l'œuvre dans les dynamiques sociales structurées par des tensions, d'interroger les liens entre discours et actions humaines, et d'explorer les conditionnements de la formation sociale du politique"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Abstract: Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these (...) points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations. (shrink)

Abstract: Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these (...) points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations. (shrink)

Responsible family ownership is a combination of the family’s commitment to the family-firm’s stakeholders in the long term and the explicit behaviour of the family members associated with the firm. However, families are not individuals but rather a system of relationships among family members. In such a context, misunderstandings in communication, anachronistic mentalities and different value systems can block the intergenerational transmission of RFO. Consequently, the responsibility of the family towards the FF’s stakeholders may be damaged and the firm’s socially (...) responsible behaviour hindered. This paper aims to identify how RFO is transferred across generations and to ascertain the role that family social capital plays in preserving the transmission of RFO from generation to generation. Our research is based on three in-depth case studies of Mexican family-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises. First, the paper identifies and contrasts a set of FSC-specific factors and problems which play a relevant role in the transmission of RFO while recognizing the influence of the mutually reinforcing dynamics of FSC dimensions. Secondly, the family’s honourableness :751–767, 2013) is identified as a key driver for sustaining the transmission of RFO. Finally, the paper identifies RFO institutionalization required to face the intrinsic problems of transmitting RFO in growing families. (shrink)

: According to Crane intentionality is nothing less than the mark of the mental. Nonetheless, there are many issues raised by this concept, beginning with the problem of non-existent relata. In this comment-article I discuss the concept of intentionality in its generality, trying to state its ontological status and to assess its explanatory dispensability. In particular, I focus on the argument, addressed by Crane, whereby Wittgenstein eliminates intentionality, characterizing it as a grammatical fiction, a pseudo-entity created by the grammar of (...) the language of mental states ascriptions. I will argue that: although Crane’s specific argument against Wittgenstein is not conclusive, Wittgenstein’s linguistic strategy does not work; and yet we should not be committed to a robust realist account of intentionality. Keywords : Intentionality; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Mark of the Mental; Ontological Commitment; Realism/Anti-realism. L’intenzionalità è sufficientemente reale? Riassunto : Il concetto di intenzionalità è l’autentico cuore della filosofia di Tim Crane, secondo il quale l’intenzionalità è niente di meno che il marchio del mentale. Nondimeno, vi sono diversi noti problemi sollevati da questo concetto. In questo articolo-commento discuto il concetto di intenzionalità nelle sue linee generali cercando, da un lato, di determinarne lo statuto ontologico e, dall’altro, di valutarne la dispensabilità esplicativa. Mi concentro in particolare sull’argomento, discusso da Crane, con cui Wittgenstein elimina l’intenzionalità, caratterizzandola come una finzione grammaticale, una pseudo-entità creata della grammatica del linguaggio con cui attribuiamo stati mentali. Sosterrò che: sebbene lo specifico argomento di Crane non sia conclusivo, la strategia “linguistica” di Wittgenstein non funziona e tuttavia non dovremmo indulgere a una concezione realista “robusta” dell’intenzionalità. Parole chiave : Intentionalità; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Marchio del mentale; Impegno ontologico; Realismo/Anti-realismo. (shrink)

Ockham é considerado por muitos como o fundador do direito positivo, por tomar ius como uma potestas individual. Ele aprofunda sua teoria no Opus nonaginta dierum, onde rebate frase por frase uma bula do papa João XXII. Nele define o que vem a ser domínio, propriedade, direito de uso, licença de uso, uso de fato, puro uso, direito do foro, direito do céu (ius poli). Com isso, ele está dando fundamentos jurídicos e teológicos ao modo de viver sem propriedade dos (...) frades menores franciscanos. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Pobreza. Franciscanismo. Domínio. Poder. Direito positivo. Direito. ABSTRACT Ockham is considered by many as the founder of positive right, for taking ius as an individual potestas. He advances his theory in the Opus nonaginta dierum, wherein he confronts sentence after sentence of a pope’s John XXII bula. There he defines what comes to be dominium, property, right of use, license of use, factual use, pure use, law of the forum, law of heaven (ius poli). With such a terminology, he is giving the juridical and theological foundations to the propriety-free way of live of the minor Franciscan friars. KEY WORDS – Poverty. Franciscanism. Dominium. Power. Positiv right. Right. (shrink)

The author claims that there is a basic difference between theTractatus and thePhilosophical Investigations; despite Bernstein's and O'Brien's claims to the contrary, there are, indeed, ‘two Wittgensteins.’ Yet, to ascertain the difference between both we must look at Wittgenstein's conceptions of philosophy rather than at his views on logic and language. Wittgenstein's different, and even divergent, views on logic and language are grounded on his two views on philosophy and not the other way around. At the same time, Wittgenstein's views (...) on philosophy are caused by his ways of conceiving the scope of philosophical activity in regard to language. Both in theTractatus and in thePhilosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein points out what is important in language for philosophy, but in each case he reaches very different conclusions. Now, when all is said, there remains one unifying factor in all of Wittgenstein's ‘investigations’: it is the question of the ‘logic of language,’ which shifts positions from theTractatus to theInvestigations, so that what was earlier a ‘hidden structure’ becomes later the ‘grammar’ of its indefinitely complexe uses. (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up (...) to the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

Jean-Luc Godard’s Alphaville puts forward a cultural critique of modern capitalism in a poetic form. The film subverts the standard classification of cinematographic “genres” and of cinematographic languages, without separating the content of the criticism from its form of expression. Thus, it uses an original language that integrates both philosophical and poetic referents, putting together elements from the dystopic imagination, the science fiction, the romantic film, and other cinematographic “genres”. Unlike Orwell and Huxley’s dystopias, Alphaville depicts a deeper, insidious, invisible (...) and more efficacious form of totalitarianism that invades the so-called “democratic” societies. This type of totalitarianism is dominated by instrumental rationality and techno-science, which expel art and imagery, the poetic and the possible, emotion, feelings and everything that is free. This paper analyzes the construction of this original form and interprets its critical content from the perspective of Godard’s thought. It is an exercise of looking and knowing how to look. (shrink)

The modern world was in part born as a reaction against Aristotelianism. However, the image of Aristotle to which modern philosophers reacted was partial, to say the least. Paradoxical though it may seem, today, more than twenty-three centuries on, we may now be in the most advantageous position for understanding the Stagirite's philosophy and applying it to contemporary problems. The present book contributes to the forming of an idea of Post-modern reason inspired by a constellation of Aristotelian concepts, such as (...) prudence (phronesis), practical truth (aletheia praktike), science in act (episteme en energeiai), metaphor (metaphora), similarity (homoiosis) and the imitation-creation pair (mimesis-poiesis). They all form an interconnected network and together they make up an idea of reason that may prove suitable for the present. These concepts offer the most promising basis for undertaking a series of urgent reconciliations: of facts and values, of means and ends, of theoretical and practical reason, of intelligence and emotion. Aristotle's notions could help solve many dualisms of modern times. He offers a third way between identity and difference in ontology and politics, between algorithm and anarchism in methodology, between naïve realism and plain relativism in epistemology, between equivocity and univocity in language, between Enlightenment and Romanticism in culture... On the way, this shift facilitates the relationships between science, arts and ethics - the three parts of the sphere of culture which Modernity had separated - as well as the integration of the sphere of culture itself with the world of life. (shrink)

For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure imported into philosophy from without, as, e.g. a mathematical demonstration in modern physics or in the proof-structure of philosophies such as Spinoza’s or Wolff’s. For both Hegel and Kant method is the arrangement that reason gives its contents and cognitions; for both, that is, method and object do not fall asunder, unlike in all disciplines other than philosophy. For Kant method is the design and plan of the whole, (...) the scientific form that guides the organization of cognitions (KrV A 707/B 736, Ak 24, 780). Likewise, Hegel writes that method is the consciousness of the form of its inner movement (WL 1, 49, SL 53, W 3 47, PhS 28). Unfortunately, Hegel never considers Kant an example or a precursor or a positive role model. It is important to ask why Hegel never takes seriously Kant’s Doctrine of Method. Why, if he shares so many central points with the Architectonic of the first Critique, does he never acknowledge Kant as a possible ally? Why does he misunderstand Kant on analysis and synthesis as he does? These are some of the questions I plan to discuss in this paper. (shrink)

This paper proposes to determine and identify the origin of the gens Valgia from Arpinum. It is possible that the Valgii, by taking advantage of the political success of Gaius Marius, like other Arpinum families, already succeeded in obtaining the senatorial rank towards the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 1st century BC. Later, thanks to Sulla's and Caesar's reforms, who sought allies among the powerful local gentes, the Valgii could consolidate their presence in Rome, until reaching (...) the consulate in 12 BC. (shrink)

Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine several notions of consistency with respect to how they can provide a platon-ist epistemology of mathematics. Only a Gödelian notion, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to (...) a platonist ontology. Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Bala-guer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. Balaguer's version of Platonism, Full-Blooded Platonism (FBP), is the view that "there are as many abstract mathematical objects as there could be-i.e., there actually exist abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds" (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381). He continues: Since FBP says that there are abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds, it follows that if FBP is true, then every purely mathematical theory that could be true-i.e., that is internally consistent-accurately describes some collection of actually existing abstract objects. Thus it follows from FBP that in order to acquire knowledge of abstract objects, all we have to do is come up with an internally consistent purely mathematical theory (and know that it is internally consistent). (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381) * To be published in 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium proceedings. (shrink)

The author shows that Hegel's philosophy entails a radical criticism of an ordinary conception of thinking. Breaking with the habitual presuppositions of modern philosophy and common sense, the author explains that thought, negation, truth, reflection, and dialectic for Hegel are not properties of an I and cannot be reduced to the subjective activity of a self-conscious subject. Rather, he elucidates, thought is objective for Hegel in different senses. Reality as a whole is animated by a movement of thought and un (...) unconscious logic as a spontaneity that reifies itself in determinate forms. The author concludes the book with a comprehensive comparison of Hegel's and Kant's concepts of reason."-- Back cover. (shrink)

In his paraphasis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Avicenna seems to adopt a first principle distintc form the one adopted by the Greek philosopher for this science. In fact, some interpreters consider him as prefering the principle of third excluded instead of the principle of non contradiction. Since I desagree with this thesis, I propose to analyse here Avicenna’s formulation of the first principle. In order to do that, I propose, first, to clarify the meaning of the first principle by looking to (...) one of the most important modern critics: Jan Lukasiewicz. To put it briefly, the question I will try to answer is: how Avicenna and Aristotle justify the nature of the logical relations. The article finishes with make some general remarks on Avicenna’s defense of the first principle. (shrink)

The activism of institutional investors tends more and more toward the supervision and control of the behavior of the managers of big companies. In this article, we present a model based on the creation of an activism index that lets us evaluate such activism’s effect on the sensitivity of the investment policies of a company in the face of financial variables (such as cash flow and liquidity ratio) and market variables (ownership concentration and value creation index). To test our assertions, (...) we analyze firm-level data for United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, France, Denmark, and Spain during the period 1995–2004. Our results point to a significant reduction in the sensitivity of company investment decisions in the face of these variables, especially relative to intangible capital, as a result of the neutralizing effect of activism on the high agency costs of free cash flow and on the information asymmetries of the market. (shrink)